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Thomas G. Rosenmeyer
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JUDGMENT AND THOUGHT IN THE THEAETETUS

The variety of meanings attached to the term doxa has been a cause of
1
The tendency has been to look for a gradual
concern to many scholars.
and tolerably consistent change in Plato's understanding of the term, in
At
tune with what is thought to have been his philosophical development.
the same time it is often recognized that the distribution of the various
senses of doxa between earlier and later dialogues does not always warrant
this perspective. One of the results of this general uncertainty about
the status of doxa has been that translators have variously rendered it

"opinion" or "belief" or "judgment," to mention only the three most promi
nent renderings. All will agree that this is an unfortunate situation.
The present paper will attempt to show that, certainly in the Theaetetus,
but probably elsewhere in ?lato also, all three translations are subject
,
to criticism.
Doxa in the sense of "belief 11 i.e., as signifying the con
viction of the truth of something, is extremely rare in Plato, as is doxa
in the sense of "judgment," i.e., as signifying the discursive combining
of two or more initially separate terms into a proposition;2
and the
word 11opiniori11 in English raises an expectation that it will be followed
by a subordinate clause, which is only infrequently the case in Greek.

A typical case of doxa being used j_n a sense other than "judgment"
occurs at Charm. 158E7 ff.
Socrates seems to suggest that if Charmides
possesses a balanced personality (sophro�yne) he.should be able to judge
what that is, i.e., he should be able to make a. statement of identity, or
a classification in terms of genus and species. But though we might put
things that way, that is not the sort of language which Socrates or his
interlocutors would understand. Socrates really means to say that if
you have something, you must have a conception of it which you ought to
be able to put into words. The word _sophros;yy\e will not do because for
the present purposes it is regarded as an unknown, like the name of a man

whom we have not met.
If you truly have the reality corresponding to the
name you are looking for, its presence within you ought to precipitate an
awareness, a thought, which acc_ording to the teachings of Prodicus wilJ
perhaps be articulable in more ways than one. If you can find an articu
lation which because of its associations with names known to you produces
in you a greater feeling of familiarity than sophrosyne would, then
you will gladly ·substitute the new term for the old. We might ,say that
the activity which Socrates encourages Charmides to undertake is the mak

ing of ,a judgment, the combination of two knowns in a meaningful relation
ship.
For Socrates, the apparent equation of sophrosyne a:r;id calmness
which follows is the substitution of a more familiar term articulating a
more distinct concept, for a less familiar term articulating a less dis
The substitution happens to be mistaken. But
tinct concept or thought.
there is nothing discursive about doxa and the verb doxazein as here used;

2

doxa simply designates the thought prompted more or less spontaneously
the soul by the presence, also in the soul, of the reality which the
thought reflects.

:rn

I suggest that in Plato doxa should be translated "thought," and
doxazein "think" wherever they occur. Such a policy would have several
One, it would avoid the bewildering variety of trans
obvious advantages.
lations now in force; two, it would take Plato's use of one and the same
word in various contexts as a hint that what is designated by it is one
and the same sort of thing (it is always dangerous to assume lightly
that Plato uses his terms negligently); and three, it would force us to
investigate further the precise nature of what Plato chooses to denote
by the term. The analysis of some of the uses of doxa in the Theaetetus
which follows is designed to attempt the beginnings of an answer to the
last point.
*

What is the relationship between aisthesis (sense-perception)3 and
In the earlier part of the Theaetetus they are not differentiated,
doxa?
for the simple reason that according to Protagoras all thoughts are ul
timately of perceptual objects.
If there is a distinction, it is merely
that doxa, instead of being identical with aisthesis, may occur through
aisthesi"S, or may be the awareness of an aisthesis. But since the term
aisthesis is used in the sense of "result in the soul" as well as "pro
cess which causes the result," and since all perception as distinct from
the mechanical motions which enter into perception is conscious, the
realities designated by the two terms are, to begin with, not distinct.
But when, 187A ff., the claim of sense perception to be knowledge
has been thrown out of court, and Socrates proceeds to focus on the sort
of cognition which can occur independently of sensation, he lays the
Earlier, i•the
foundation for a distinction between aisthesis and doxa.
work of the soul by herself" had meant the kind of perceiving which goes
hand in hand with the sensing through the organs, the perceiving of being
and difference and numbers which is a necessary part of every complex

perception.4 Now Socrates begins to mean by the "work of the soul by
herself" the thinking which may go on in the absence of any immediate
perception.
And this thinking he calls doxazein, 187a8.5
Such thinking
now is held to apprehend objects which, if we were talking of direct per

ception, would include objects of physical sensation:
I think "stone."
Thus, of the two meanings of the phrase "'the work of the soul by herself,"
the first, i.e., perception minus the elements contributed by the sense
organs, is dispensed with in favor of the second, i.e., thinkinr,, in the
absence of direct perception, of objects otherwise apprehended by sense
perception.
And in the end, doxa comes to mean "thinking" of perceptual

objects, whether the act of perception is prior in time or not.
In the
fourth examination of error, for instance (191A8 ff.), doxa is triggered
by sensation and memory, and becomes itself a kind of perception. But,
initially at least, as is indicated by the premises of the first, second
and third examinations of error (cf. below, appendix), no immediate appre
hensi n via the sense organs seems to be involved in the making of a
g
doxa.

·

3
Even where, however, doxa is not identical with perception, it is
analogous to it. In the fourth examination of error, on the occasion of
describing the wax tablet, Socrates 191D6 ff. parallels perceptions and
thoughts as both effecting memory when stored or registered on the tab
let.
And a little later. at 195A7, Socrates suggests that those whose
retained impressions, i.e., former perceptions now filed away on the
tablet, are indistinct and confused. will not, when faced with new im
pressions, correlate them properly but 11see and hear and think amiss."
Error, thus, is a matter of faulty vision or hearing or thinking;
thought is paralleled with perception.
Here, as elsewhere in Plato, it
is apparent that thinking is prompted by objects precisely as hearing
and smelling are. But if it is correct to say that thought is analogous
to perception, then doxa cannot be judgment. The most characteristic
thing about those who have true doxai, and the point in which they fall
most distinctly short of rationa'f understanding, is their complete lack
of the capacity or willingness to initiate a mental act and to operate
dialectically, to combine and analyze,? In the dream which is related
near the end of the Theaetetus and which is occasioned by the difficulty
of the word logos, it is said that a true doxa as distinct from knowledge
It must be admitted, of course, that
does not have logos (20288 ff.),
this line of attack fails; it is impossible to arrive at a definition of
knowledge by starting from perception or its analogue thought. But the
readiness to assume without further question that doxa as such does not
involve logos must count for something.
As we shall see, even when doxa
is combined with logos in some other fashion it need not be, and perhaps
cannot be judgment.
Throughout the five examinations of error, error is conceived of as
false thought rather than false judgment.
Cornford, though in general
committed to the translation "judgment," seems to have felt that this.
was not always the appropriate rendering. for on occasion he speaks. of
"notion or judgment,118 or "belief," But false doxa is neither false
judgment nor false belief, as a hurried glance at some of the stages in
the fivefold examination of error will show.
In the second examination.
for instance, Socrates argues (188D3 ff.) that thinking something which
does not exist is impossible, just as it would be impossible to perceive
In other words, that which
something which is at the same time nothing.
is not, is nothing. Now on the premise that Plato is talking about
judgments this sort of talk is patently casuistic, and some critics have
asked us to recognize a sophistic element in the argument.9 But if
doxazein is merely 11 to think,11 the argument is quite in order. You can
not think a nothing. In terms of mere being and not-being. error is
impossible.
In the fourth examination(l94A3), making an error is compared to an
archer trying to hit the goal but missing it. That is to say, the soul
thinks x, while she should have thought y.
Again, no judgment seems tC)
be involved. Similarly in the fifth examination error is thought of as
a wrong grabbing, or rather the grabbing of the wrong bird.
In all
these cases, doxa means 11notion11 or "thought" rather than the combina
tion of two or more notions into a judgment.10

4
The same thing remains true after the refutation of the second thesis,
that knowledge is true doxa. When in the course of exploring the value of
the third thesis that knowledge is true doxa plus logos, Socrates 207Al ff.
takes true doxa plus logos to be a corr�ct enumeration of the parts of
a complex object of thought (in this case, the parts of a wagon), agai11
no judgment is involved. I think "wheel" and "axle" and "box," and
though I think them in sequence rather than in the fashion in which I
would perceive them if the wagon were present to my senses, I do not make
the sort of connexi.on between them which would render a judgment.
Can there be a doxa of a simple, i.e., of an irreducible phenomenon
corresponding to an irreducible Form? Perhaps the chief difference be

tween a perception proper and a doxa is that for the former, its object
always contains the element of existence, whereas for the latter it does
not. That is to say, a perception, even if put in the form "Green grassl",
really means:
"This is green grass," while the thought "green grass,"
though always, if sometimes very indirectly, referable to an external

existent, does not as such contain a reference to the existence of the
object.
But though existence need not be a constituent of the thought
datum, there are other constituents which prevent the Platonic doxa from

ever being the doxa of a simple. For instance, as Plato puts
course of investigating the third thesis (209Dl-2): "The true
anything must
include the differentness of that thing.1111
earlier, in his account of the dream, Socrates had touched on
(202B6); he there distinguished doxa from sensation by saying
latter apprehends simples, the former complexes (syllabai).12

it in the
thought of
Even
this
that the
Simples.
cannot be talked about or known, they can only be sensed; complexes can
be known and referred to in speech and thought by true thought.
To be
sure, Plato subsequently seems to challenge this distinction when, 206Al
ff., he cites the evidence of the alphabet against the notion that a com
• •

•

plex is more easily apprehended than a simple; elements, he suggests,
produce a more distinct apprehension than complexes and produce such an
apprehension more effectively, for letters are learnt more clearly and
with greater ease than syllables of words. But the force of this chal
lenge, based as it is on the premises of the dream, is more apparent than
For a letter of the alphabet may be simpler than a written word,
real.
but it is by no means a simple object of perception or thought.
In
Plato's philosophy, in spite of the curious allegations of the dream, a
simple can be neither perceived nor thought nor articulated.
We must now consider some modern testimony to the effect that thought
without judgment is impossible; further, we must take up some Platonic
texts which at first glance seem to advance the same proposition. Suse
mihl speaks as most Platonic scholars do when he says:
"Hence the concept
Among recent philosophers, C. D.
is the first result of reflection.1113
Broad distinguishes between "seeing" and "thinking" by saying that "a
percept:ual situation is 1intuitive1, whilst a thought-situation with the
same kind of epistemological object is 'discursive'
I do not wish
to deny that there may be something intuitive in every thought-situation
and something discursive in every perceptual situation
1114 It is a
nice question, which I have not been able to. resolve for rt,yself, ·whether
according to Plato's teaching perception and thought can share the same
epistemological object. Certainly in the Theaetetus it appears
• • •

•

•• •

as if Plato thought they could.

•

5
At any rate, when Broad proceeds to demonstrate the discursive character
of thought by stressing the fact that we use a preposition, "thinking
about" or "of," rather than the simple accusative case to refer to the
object, his case becomes hopeless, for not only is this not true in

Greek, it is not necessarily true in English either. Even Reid had
said:
"We may dist:mctly conceive a proposition, without judging of it
at all.1115
Of the two thoughts "tree" and "Theaetetus is handsome,"
the latter may be described as the mental correlate of a proposition.

But it is the former type which seems to be important for Plato, appar

ently furnishing him with his cue for treating the second type of

thought also as if it were of an intuitively apprehended complex object.
Plato cannot do anything.· else.

In his account of perception, 156C6 ff. ,

also 182AJ ff., he includes the p erception of a quality in the act of
perception itself.
I see whiteness or handsomeness along with the vari
ous other elements included in the complex object of vision.

But if

this is so, then, when Theaetetus is perceived, his handsomeness is
p art of the original perceptual object, and the apprehension of hand
someness is included in the perception of Theaetetus. And when the

thought "Theaetetus is handsome" occurs independently of direct percep
tion, it is ,merely the recapturing of a previous perception, or rather

the selection and subsequent articulation of a small fraction of the
complex originally perceived.

What, then, is a doxa of things to come?
For, ostensibly in rebuttal
of the sensationalist relativism of Protagoras, but really in support of
Protagoras' contention that the area of good and bad allows for some
limited expertise, Socrates shows, 178B9 ff., that experts are better
prognosticators of the things which will happen in the future than non

experts. As far as the major question "What is knowledge" is concerned,
tM:s section of the dialogue contributes effectively to the ultimate
finding that it is not sensation. But this does not concern us at the
moment.
A false doxa of things to come should, one supposes, be ex

pressed in a proposition containing a verb in the future tense. But
Plato's language speaks against this. The whole discussion is conducted
as if the wrongness of the non-expert were not a matter of faulty judg
ment but a matter of delusion; he has the wrong presentiment, he

thinks-before (prodoxaz,ei 178E5) "sweet" rather than 11bitter.11

Prog

nostication, in these terms, is closer to prophecy, the present aware

ness of an anticipated future experience, or rather the experiencing in
the present of what is not yet apprehensible by ordinary mortals, than
to

a

judgment formed on the basis of premises.

And it seems to differ

very little from the kind of thing which Protagoras is talking about

when he credits the expert with the capacity of causing a person who

has had bad phainomena to have good phainomena (166D6-8).
who thinks "bitter" when eating a certain food.

Take a man A

The expert, proceeding

from the correct or healthy presentiment, changes the man A into the

man B; as a result, the man B thinks 11sweet11 when eating the same food.

This transformation, the implanting of healthier perceptions and thoughts

in the citizens, is achieved by the expert by means of persuasion rather

than teaching; he affects not the reasoning processes but the "emotions"
or, as we might say more correctly, the perceptual tendencies of his
subjects.

This is what Socrates puts into the mouth of Protagoras, and

there is nothing to suggest that it does not reflect Plato's own feel·
ings in the matter.

6
A new difficulty is introduced when in the third examination of error,
189E4 - 190A6, Socrates makes a distinction between doxa and doxazein.
The latter seems to be identified with "reflecting" "(d'ianoeisthai) or the
dialogue of the soul with herself, while the former is said to be the�
sult of doxazein. The dialogue of the soul is 11about the things which
(1) the
she inspects." Thus we seem to have three different phases:
soul inspects objects; (2) the soul converses with herself concerning
these objects; and (3) the soul arrives at a decision concerning them.
The difficulty with all this is that elsewhere in the same examination
(a) "inspecting" (skopein) and "thinking" (doxazein) seem to be identi
fied, 189CJ-4 (cf. also the paralleling of "thinking" [doxazon] and
"touching" [ephaptomenos], 190C6, also 190D9-10); and (b) the internal
conversation of the soul and the final decision are l)Ot always dis
tinguished; either may be called doxazein: 190D4-8 . 16 The terminological
uncertainty affecting the argument appears to mirror a major difficulty
which may well be obliquely hinted at by Socrates' ironic remark, 189E7,
that he is giving his explanation without knowing anything about the sub
ject: a re-emphasis of Socrates1 traditional attitude which is rather
rare in the logical part of the Theaetetus.

The point is that Plato allows himself to be swayed by such terms
as "reflecting" (dianoeisthai), "conversing" (dialegesthai) and "stock
taking" (syllogizesthai) to approximate "thinking" to considering and
,judging. From what we have established about the complex nature of the
object'of doxa, it follows that once a doxa is articulated it is likely
to be expressed in terms of subject and predicate (206Dl ff.). The
soul assembles certain data originally submitted by a combination of
sensation and her own proper activity, and thus produces a thought.
This process of assembling may properly be called a "stock-taking" or a
"conversing with herself,11 but it should be understood that such stocktaking or internal dialogue does nothing more than
re-create the
original perceptual structure, and that it is not experienced on the
level of consciousness. The man, as distinct from his soul, becomes
aware only of the final product of this operation within the soul,
namely the thought. This is what Plato seems to have in mind when in
the Sophist (264A8 ff.) he calls thought a 11 realization11 or "conclusion"
11
considering is a convers
of considering (dianoias apoteleutesis):
ing of the soul with herself, and doxa :i.s a realization of considering
n
(cf. Theaet. 189E6-7). The conversation is a silent conversation,
it is 2re-verbal, a conversation only in the figurative sense of the
word.lr In fact, the whole section about tpe soul conversing is a metaphor to account for the complexity of doxa .18
•

,

,

•

•

•

•

·

Now what Plato does is, for a brief moment, to neglect the differ
ence between this unconscious activity of the soul and the conscious
process of judging. At one point in the third examination of error,
190A9, Plato substitutes for his previous formulation of error, namely
the thinking of one thing in the place of another (189C2-J), a new
formulation to the effect that error is thinking that one thing is
another, and gives as examples of this type of equation the thought
that the fair is ugly, or that the unjust is just, or that the odd is
even. Surely, Socrates hastens to remark, this kind of thought has
never occurred to anyone even in his wildest dreams; not even a sick

7
man or a madman would dare to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or
two is one.

Hence error is impossible.

ltJhat Plato has done here is to

substitute the nonsensical judgment "the ox is a horse" for the perfectly

legitimate thought "this is a horse,11 which is false but not nonsensical
if the object I should have thought of is in fact not a horse but an ox.

Plato's deviation from the logic of the argument is to be explained as a

venture stimulated by the terms "considering" and "stock-taking" and
In any case, the venture
"conversing" in an irrelevant judgmental sense.
is short-lived; it helps Socrates to present his interlocutors with a

blind alley and force them into approaching the problem of error by means
of a new examination which, incidentally, continues to operate with the

notions of considering and stock-taking and comparing, but now in their

proper sense -- proper within the context of the examinations of error -
Hence the terms of the fourth and
as unconscious activities of the soul.
fifth examinations of error help to prove our contention that the opening
up of a judgmental horizon in the third examination is illegitimate and
abortive, and that Plato recognized it to be so.

A further objection to the notion that doxa is not judgment, or, in
other words, that a doxa is always of things and not about them, stems

from the fact that in the Pl atonic text doxa is often followed by the
That the objection has no force becomes evi

preposition "about" (peri).

dent from even a cursory perusal of the passages in question, for doxa
per� and doxa followed by the simple (objective) genitive case (or

doxazein peri and doxazein followed by the accusative case) are appar
ently used without distinction, and often indeed within one and the same
sentence.19

Peri, therefore, does not refer to the reality about which

a judgment is made, but to the reality in the presence of which or
through whose agency a thought implants itself in the soul.
For this
use of peri, roughly meaning 11with reference to" or "in connexion with,"
there are many parallels in Plato. Modern interpretation might hazard

the guess that, after doxa, peri points to the external object of thought

while the simple genitive designates the thought-datum or thought-result.
But it is very doubtful whether Plato meant to distinguish in principle
between an object and a datum of thought or of any other type of cogni
tion.

The object of a thought is not dealt with separately from the con

tent of the thought.

The constituents of a complex thought object are to

be rediscovered in the content of thought.

False thought, like false per

ception, is apprehending a complex object which either is not structured

as the object which prompts it -- though the constituents are the same -
or which is not the object expected or required, given the logic of the
situation which produces the thought.

That on either alternative there

are serious psychological and philosophical difficulties which pres�; for

clarification need not deter us.
\rfuat matters is that for Plato both
thought and perception can be false apparently because of the unrelia
bility of the soul, which does not always respond truly to the prompt

ings of the external object, having as she does an immense variety of

memory imprints at her disposal, ready to be activated into thought at
But without the postulate of the external exist
the slightest impulse.
ence of the objects of thought, whatever they are, Plato's epistemology
would collapse, and the idealist interpreters would have the field to
themselves.

Hence Plato must say that false thinking is thinking an·

8
object which is false or that the object which has stimulated the soul

to think need not be the same as the object which the soul finally comes
to think.20
*

In the preceding, we have analyzed doxa as prompted either by a pres

ent perception or by a past perception registered and resuscitated.
is, however, also a doxa prompted by a Form, or a complex of Forms.

'i'here
At

the conclusion o.f the fourth examination of error, 195El ff., Socrates
introduces the problem which later occasions the distinction between
latent memory and actual recall, made in the course of the fifth exami

nation.

How can a man, he asks, when totalling 5 and 7, make the error

of thinking that the sum is 11?
The kind of doxa which Socrates has in
mind here is different from the doxa discussedheretofore, because the
objects of this do� are not perceptual objects, either present or past,
but simple constituents of perceptual objects, of a kind which cannot be

perceived by themselves.

The thought "eleven" is analogous to the
11here are eleven men" is a thought analogous to the
thought 11this is a white stone11; both 11white11 and 11eleven11 may function
thought "white";

as constituents of a perceptual e:Xperience, but thought by themselves
21
they point beyond perception to the world of' the Forms.

But are we referring to Forms when we think:
"white plus black is
grey"?
In the eyes of some, perhaps, it is nonsense to say that when you

combine the notion of white with the notion of black you obtain the notion
of grey.

But in Platonic terms this may not be absurd at all.

In some

contexts Plato apparently thought that the Form of white is white, and
the Form of black is blacki hence the issue of any miscegenation between

them1 if such a thing is possible (and I suspect it is) would be grey.
Similarly when we think:
11white plus black is green11 we are not thinking

nonsense but thinking falsely.
combine them into

a

So, you may think the Forms 5 and 7, and

sum, and make a mistake in doing so,

without the

slightest interference of the elements of sensation and perception

which, it had been determined in the fourth examination, are the only
factors which make false thinking possible.

How can that be?

I would like to propose that though Plato d Q eS not pretend to give
us a real solution of the puzzle, he does suggest, a way of solving it by
treating 5 and 7 as if they were not Forms known to the soul but Forms
unknown and therefore behaving much like perceptual objects dimly per
We have seen that for Plato false thought is false naming or
ceived.
I think a false thought
identification rather than false equation.
when, under the influence of a misleading perceptual situation, the
thought x or yx presents itself to me rather than the thought z or yz.

Now that is precisely the sort of experience which is envisaged by

Plato in the false summing of 5 and 7, except that 5 and 7 are not per

ceptual objects (in spite of eskepsato, 196A5)

but objects whose rela

tion to 11 and 12 is merely analogous to the relation between percep
tual objects and thought objects in the fourth examination of error.

Since both 5 and 7, on the one hand, and 11 and 12, on the other, are
objects of knowledge, Socrates broaches the question whether we ought

not to distinguish between two types of knowledge.

As is well known,
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d¥Ë ªt_Ë _¥Z_ª«EË ¨zª«GªzË u_¥_Ë «¨_]Ë G¨Ë EË F¥G]zmË

ZdË ªu_Ë d«¥ªtË _¼EzFªzË dË _¥¥¥Ë W_· Ë ._]z¼ Ë

%Ë E]Ë 'Ë WaZ_Ë

W_Zª¨Ë dË Kª_ªË ·_]j_Ë ªu_Ë _ªË ªu_¾Ë E¥_Ë «ªË ªj_ªu_¥Ë zªË _Ë
uLªË d¥Ë ªu_Ë «¥¨_Ë dË ¨±²zj,Ë ªu_¿Ë ¨_Ë ªu_z¥Ë z]_ªzª¿ Ë E]Ë ªj_ªu_¥Ë
d¥Ë FË _¶Ë z]_ªzª¿Ë ·uzZuË z¨Ë F¨Ë ¿_ªË «»Ë
?Ë «¨bË ªu_Ë -EªzZË ª_¥Ç
zj¾)Ë %Ë F]Ë 'Ë F¥_Ë z]z³z]«F¿Ë u_] Ë W«ªË %Ë «¨Ë ' Ë z¨Ë ¿Ë
¨¨_¨¨_] Ë F]Ë zË ªt_Ë ¥Z_¨¨Ë dË Z³_¥ªzjË ªu_Ë ¨¨_¨¨zË zªË EË FZÆ
ª«EË t]zjË ªt_Ë ªªE_¥Ë ¶{Ë uzªË ªt_Ë ¶¥jË W_ZªË dË ·_]j_Ë
8 Eª¨Ë En«Ej_Ë z¨Ë ¢«zª_Ë ¨_ZzdzZË Ë ªtz¨Ë {ª*Ë

ªt_Ë ¨±²zjË dË %Ë E]Ë

'Ë zªË  ¥Ë "Ë z¨Ë ªË GË EZªË dË _¢«FªzjË ª¶Ë »¨ Ë W«ªË FË FZªË dË
j¥FWWzjË FË » Ë EªË ªt_Ë ¥ªzjË dË EË Z_¼Ë ªu«jtªË W_ZªË ¶uzZuË z¨Ë
d¥Ë ªt_Ë «¥¨_¨Ë dË ªu_Ë Ez°Fªz Ë ¾Ë Fª_ª¿Ë »Ë ¥Ë ³z¥ª«E¾Ë
°¶Ë
?uz¨Ë FE¾¨z¨Ë _F³_¨Ë F¿Ë ]zddzZ°ªz_¨Ë ¨³_]Ë

<_Ë dË ªu_Ë F¥ÉË

]«_Ë ªË ªu_Ë dFZªË ªuFªË WªuË ;Z¥Eª_¨Ë M]Ë =t_F_ª_ª«¨Ë ¥_d_¥Ë ªË ªt_Ë «W_¥¨Ë
ªË ¾Ë E¨Ë W_Zª¨Ë dË ¶_]j_Ë W«ªË E¨Ë F¨Ë z_Z_¨Ë eË ·c]j_Ë
ª_Fz Ë

DtFªË z¨Ë ¥_ Ë >t_F_ª_ª«¨Ë ¨__¨Ë ªË F¨¨°_Ë ªuFªË ªË ¿Ë  W«ªË

F¨Ë ªu_Ë _£«FªzË
zj¥EZ_Ë

%Ë «¨Ë 'Ë _¢«F¨Ë  Ë z¨Ë GË z_Z_Ë dË ¶_]j_Ë ¥Ë

:Z¥Fª_¨Ë ]_¨Ë ªË dFË zË ¶zªuË ªuz¨Ë «¨_Ë dË Go«Fj_Ë

zjË ªË uz Ë Ë F]Ë #Ë G¥_Ë z_Z_¨Ë fË ·_]j_ Ë ªu_Ë _¢«FªzË
_¢F¨Ë ! Ë z¨Ë ªË

6ZZ¥]Æ

%Ë «¨Ë 'Ë

0«ªË uz¨Ë Z¥zªzZz¨Ë dË =u_E_ª_ª¬¨Ë ¥¨FË z¨Ë ªË F¨Ë

ªu¥«jwjzjË F¨Ë ¶_Ë ¨t¬]Ë ¶z¨uË zªË ªË W_Ë

|Ê] Ë F¨Ë F·F¿¨ Ë ;Z¥Fª_¨Ë z¨Ë

tN_¥_]Ë W¿Ë uz¨Ë «»~zj_¨¨Ë ªË Z¨z]_¥Ë ªu_Ë ¥W_Ë dË _¥¥¥Ë G¨Ë FË ®¥_¿Ë
¨¾ZujzZFË ¥Fªt_¥Ë ªtOË FË _ªEt¾¨zZFË ¥W_Ë

7_³_¥ªt__¨¨ Ë zªË ¨u]Ë

W_Ë Z_F¥Ë d¥Ë ªuz¨Ë Z«¥¨¥¾Ë EE¾¨z¨Ë dË ¸uFªË 9EªË u}¨_dË ¨__¨Ë ªË uF³_Ë
¥_jF¥]_]Ë P¨Ë FË z¨«W_Ë ]zddzZ°ª¿Ë ªuGªË F¥zªy_ªz\FË _¥¥¥Ë z¨Ë ªË FË
Eªª_¥Ë gË dE«ª¿Ë _¤«EªzpË W¯ªË dË dG¬ª¾Ë z]_ªzdÀzqË

t_Ë ªu«juªË %Ë «¨Ë

'Ë ¥_¥_¨_ª¨Ë FË FZªz³FªzrË ]_³zZ_Ë ¶uzZtË F¾Ë ¨_]Ë ªt_Ë E³zG¥z¨ªË ddË Ë EË
¶z]Ë j¨_Ë ZuF¨_Ë

3¥Ë

%Ë «¨Ë ' Ë z¨Ë MË W_ZªË ¾Ë ]z¿Ë ]z¨Z_¥_]Ë zË

ªu«juªË ªË ·uzZuË 5Ë ¶FªË ªË jz³_Ë FË Q_Ë ºuzZtË Z¥¦_¨]¨Ë ªË FË ¶_]s_Ë
·uzZtË  tE³_Ë »zªtzË _Ë

/]Ë ªuz¨Ë W¥zj¨Ë «¨Ë WFZË ªË ªu_Ë

G¨¨Rj_Ë

Zzª_]Ë FªË ªt_Ë W_jzzjË dË ªt_Ë E_¥Ë zË ·uzZuË <Z¥Mª_¨Ë E¨¨Ë ªt_Ë W¿Ë ªË
¨«W¨ªzª«ª_Ë Fªt_¥Ë F_Ë d¥Ë ¨u§&¨Á_Ë
ZE_¨¨Ë d¥Ë ªt_Ë ³z¥ª«EË «·Ë

Bt_Ë ¨«W¨ªzª«ªzË dË ªu_Ë ´Ë
z¨Ë EË _¥¥¥Ë ¥_Z}¨_¾Ë

z_Ë ªt_Ë ¨«W¨ªzª«ªzË dË ªt_Ë »Ë  h¥Ë ªu_Ë ³z¥ª«FË «¶Ë %Ë «¨Ë 'ÈË
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dË E¥zªx_ªzZFË _¥¥¥Ë °ªzË ·_Ë ZFË _¼SzË t·Ë zªË z¨Ë ¨¨zW_Ë d¥Ë 2tT¦z]_¨ Ë
·uË ¨« ¨_]ÂË uF¨Ë
«¨Ë

µªuzË u}Ë ªË jz³_Ë zªË
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Second examination, 188C9 ff.

there is only t.

Premise:

Consequence:
On the analogy of the impossibility of C
(

C

(

C

(

"t

tC:

impossible

--�

tC:

impossible

--

sC and C

--�

--

7

sC,

I have bracketed the two formulations because in the text they do not ap
pear separately.
Rather, the text could be interpret(3d to mean the one
or the other,

Since, however, the second formulation postulates the non

existence of the external object, which is impossible in Platonic terms,

the fi.rst formulation would seem to be the appropriate one if
to be made.
Third examination, 189Bl 2 ff,

a

choice had

there is only t.

Premise:

Consequence:
cl

--

7

.

2
tc :

impossible.

The third examination differs from the first in that no memory is involved;
it differs from the second in that more than one object of thought if: ,n
volved.
'The formulation (cl and c2) --7 t(11cl = cZ 11) is briefly con
sidered by. Socrates, only to be rejected as nonsensical.

However, it is

nonsensical only because of Socrates' sleight-of-hand premise that c1 and
c2 are contraries or incompatibles.
Actuall , Platonic diaeresis offers
many examples in which (cl and c2) --� t(11C
=
c 211) is regarded as valid,

l

or plausible.
Take such a statement as 11 rhetoric is a humoring art11 (Gor
gias 46JA6 ff.).
By thus prejudicing the plausibilj.ty of the judgmenta l
formulation, Plato clearly means to keep it out of the running during the
present discussion.24
Fourth exarn:i.nation, 191A2 ff.

there are m, m, s, s and t.2.5

Premise:

Consequences:
A:

Csml

B:

Csml

C:

Csml

D:

Csml

E:

Csml

J:t"':

Csml

G:

csml

t(Csm2):

impossible

--�

t(csm2):

impossible

19JA8 ff.

--�

t(Csm2):

impossible

193Bl ff.

--j

t(Csm2):

impossible

--1

t(Csm2):

impossible

--�

t(csm2):

impossible

�

t(CSni2):

impossible;

--1

--

Examples: 192D3 ff.' E8 ff.

=

c

193Bl ff.

12
I-I:

Csml

--�

t(Csm2):

impossible

I:

Csml

--�

t(Csm2):

impossible

J:

Csm1

-- .;.

t(Csm2):

impossible

K:

Csml

- �

t(csm.2):

impossible

L:

csm1

�

t(c5m2):

impossible;

M:

l
csm.

--�

t(Csm2):

impossible;

N:

1
Csm

---7>

t(Csm2):

impossible;

-

--

;

19JD10 ff.

=

c, G

=

H

=

D

Thus, under A to N, 10 cases are considered and declared impossible.
considered are the following 6 cases:
Csml

->

t(Csm2)

Csml

--1

t(csm.2)

Csml

-- 1

t(Csm2)

Csm1

--�

t(Csm2)

Csml

--

t(Csm2)

csrnl

--

__

�
,;.>

Not

t(csm.2)

Finally, Plato determines three cas es in which error is possible:
0:

(Csml and Csm2)

__

,,

t(cslm2)

19JD5 ff., 194A6 ff,

P:

(Csm.l and Csm2)

--�

6
t(cslm2) ;2

Q:

(Csml and Csm2)

--1

1
t(cslm2) and/or t(cs2m ).

19JB9 ff., E6 ff.

The summation of the fourth examination is given at 194B 2-6: for error to
be possible, there has to be bot!f s and m. When they are both distinct
and clear, sl goes with ml and s2 with m2 (cases I, J, and K) and error
is ruled out.
But when s is indistinct and m shallow, sl may go with m2
or s2 with ml (cases O, P and Q), and then error occurs. The example of
Q, 19JB9 ff., shows that in o, P, and Q, cl and c2 are understood as
operating simultaneously. My chief argument for the suggestion that 0
and P are not identical with any of the six cases of which I say that
they are not discussed, is that if they were, Q would have to be identi
cal with I, which it plainly is not. What a compound of one sensation
Plato has
with another memory could be like is difficult to imagine.
not yet, at tM.s stage, distinguished between two types of m, possession
and holding, or latent and actual.

13
Transition from the fourth to the fifth examination, 195El ff.

Socrates ostensibly suggests that case A of the fourth examination is
possible after all, seeing that we can confuse 11 and 12, i.e.,

11

t(l2).

--�

This seems to show that error may be possible without

the operation of s

,

purely on the level of m.

Fifth examination; 196Dl ff.

Premise:

there is only t, m, and ffi,

but m may be either m (latent memory) or M (positive recall): 197B4 ff.
Consequence:
if c1 plus c2 equals c3,

__

_,

t(CM

4

)

•

After first assuming that this is possible (199Bl ff.), Socrates immedi
ately turns around (199C7 ff.) and questions the possibility, on grounds
which have struck commentators as obscure.

Theaetet�s then suggests that

perhaps in addition to m and M, there is also ffi and M, but this sugges

tion is refuted by Socrates (20081 ff.) along the lines taken in the first
examination.
In the end, the distinction between m and M seems to be
115 plus 7 equals 11" comes -; _,
dropped, and the error in question, i.e.
,
be regarded as a simple case of c3
7 t(c4), which is of course im

possible.

--
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for Ancient Greek Philosophy in New

York City.

14
NOTES
1)

A pertinent discussion may be found in any one of the standard treat
ments of Platonic philosophy. Two recent studies specifically devoted
H. Perls,
to the problem of doxi!-. may be singled out for mention:
PlatQ!!: Sa Conception du Kosmos (New York 1945) chs. vi and vii; and
C. A. Viano, "Il significato della doxa nella filosofia di Platone,11
Rivista di Filosofia 43 (1952) 167-185. Both Perls and Viano, like

most other writers who have dealt with Platonic doxa, are interested
in the relationship between dox� and the several other cognitive
capacities and activities rather than in the psychological structure
or mode of operation of doxa itself. For some reason, the question:
how precisely does doxa operate and what does it do? has only rare:l.J
been asked. A notable exception to this rule is N. R. Murphy, who

has a searching though largely inconclusive investigation of the
meaning of doxa in the RepubliQ in his 'The Int�etation of Plato 1 s
Republic (Oxford 19.51) ch. vi.
References to the Platonic text are
given according to John Burnet1s edition in the Bibliotheca Oxoniensis.
2)

In the sequel I shall use the terms "discursive" and "intuitive."
In
discursive thinking, consciousness of the whole comes after conscious
ness of the parts; in intuitive thinking, the whole is apprehended
before it is analyzed into parts.

J)

Plato uses the term aisthesis indifferently to refer both to the work
of the sense organs, i.e., the purely physical processes whereby
sense organ and sense object cause each other to establish contact
with one another; and to the work of the soul which combines the data
furnished by the senses and makes her own special contribution to
create a perceptual awareness.
The former type of aisthesis does
not involve the soul at all.
Hence the modern distinction between

sensation and perception is not relevant to Plato's distinction be
tween two types of aisthes:i.s.
For our purpose, the purpose of trac
ing the relation between aisthesis and doxa, i.t is the second type
of aisthesis, perception via the soul, which counts.
4)

Cf. 185Cl.i- ff. The perception of non-sensory items must not be con
fused with the intuiting of Forms.

5)

In spite of the apparent agreement between this formulation and Plato's
"deviation" concerning judgment at 186B6 (cf. text, pp. 6-7), the ex
amples used in the subsequent fivefold examination of error dernonst'"lte
that "the work of the soul by herself" in the sequel does not mean
"reflection upon the Forms themselves."

6)

For doxazein, Plato occasionally uses other terms such as oie0Ba1.
(Theaet. 191E6 ff.), �ye'C0Ba1. (188B7), et<; ..�v 01.6:vo1.av t-a�e'Cv
(188B9), TO 01.avot q 't"t-8e0Ba1, (189D8); cf. Viano (above, note 1) 177•
This oscillation of terms reflects the stylistic peculiarity of the
Theaetetus, which is at one and the same time a rigorous exercise in
logic and a document of belles lettres.

7)

Cf. Meno 98Al ff., especially the comparison of those who have true
doxai with prophets and oracle mongers, 99c3.

15
8)

F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York

9)

See, for instance, P. Friedlaender, Platon vol.

10)

Miss W. Hicken,

1957) 155

middle.

2 (Berlin 1930) 447.

11The Character and Provenance of Socrates' 'Dream'

in the Theaetetus,11 Phronesis 3

(1958) 128

points to the image

from the law-courts to support her opinion that "doxazein seems to
mean 1to believe a proposition', i.e., that so-and-so stole from
or did violence to someone else."
I should rather say that the
oratory of the advocates prompts the jurors to accept not so much
a proposition but a fact:
(there has been) theft, or (there has
been) violence. Miss Hicken's 11so-and-so11 and "someone else" are
not in the text.

The datives

oL� &noo•cpovµ£voL�

•

•

•

BLaCoµ£voL�

refer to the original fact, not the doxa inspired by the advocate.
The lawyer manages to make his audie�experience the illusion of
a perception; he supplies them with perceptual data in the absence
of a process of perception.

11)

Socrates'

argument at 209A7 ff. is slightly disingenuous.

He is

discussing the third sense of logos, i.e., 11account of specific
difference.11
The thesis is that true doxa plus this sort of logos
is knowledge.
But, Socrates objects, does this mean that a true
doxa does not apprehend the specific difference of its object?
That would be impossible.

-- Socrates is willing to overlook the

obvious sue;gestion that true doxa certainly does include an aware
ness of specific difference, but that this doxa does not become
knowledge until the awareness has been promoted to the status of
reflected consideration or analysis.
Nevertheless, Socrates'
objection shows clearly that for Plato the simple act of recogni
tion -- for doxa here equals "awareness of object perceived pre
viously" -- involves the perceptual acceptci.nce of a complex object.

12)

The alleged authority for the dream theory seems to be of the opin
ion that not only unconscious physical sensation but perception via
the soul is of simples, for he calls the simples namable: 202B2.
But this is only one of the many infelicities of the theory which
Plato himself would disavow.

1 3)

F. Susemihl, Die genetische Entwicklung der J:.>latonischen Dialoge
(Leipzig 1855) 192.
Cf. h.. E. Taylor, Plato (New York 1936) 339:
"The common name for the process of reflection, comparison and dis
crimination to which the occurrence of our sensations gives rise is
1belief1 or. 'judgment' (doxa, to doxazon). The word doxa is being
used here in

a

way characteristic of Plato's later dialogues

the meaning is judgment, intellectual conviction in general."
the equating of judgment and conviction.

14)
15)

C. D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (London

1925)

•

•

•

Note

141-1-.

SirW. Hamilton, ed., 'I'he Works of Thomas Reid vol. 1 (Edinburgh
on the Intellectual Powers of Man," essay 4 ch. 3

1895), "Essays
p. 375·
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24)

At 189E3 Socrates makes allowance for the tirne element required by
the making of a judgment, though not by the thinking of a thought.
Cf. Friedlaender (above, note 9) 447 note 2, who shows that the
The allowance for
words are spoken by Socrates, not by Theaetetus.
duration, like the rest of the judgmental notions referred to in
the third examination, is of no significance for the sequel of the
discussion.

25)

I do.not understand Cornford's statement (above, note 16) 120 that
this examination operates with a notion which had not been used be
fore, i.e., memory.
As seen above, the first examination operated
with rn.
Rather i� is s which is now added to the premises.

26)

At 192Cl0, the thought is to be completed as follows:
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